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1Designing Democratic 
Innovations as Deliberative 
Systems: The Ambitious Case of 
NHS Citizen  
Recent innovations to promote citizen participation in political and policy-making processes 
have been inextricably connected with deliberative democratic theory.  The focus has tended 
to be on the design and impact of discrete participatory democratic institutions that attempt 
to approximate deliberative ideals. Yet deliberative theory has recently undergone a 
systemic turn that is in large part a reaction to these attempts at institutionalising deliberative 
norms. Where once the literature abounded with good news stories of novel participatory 
governance initiatives, there is now a growing sense that the concentration on the 
deliberative qualities of individual forums comes at the cost of the broader and more 
fundamental project to make democratic systems as a whole more inclusive and reflective 
(Mansbridge et al., 2012; Owen & Smith, 2015). This poses the question of how the shift to 
deliberative systems theory might inform more systems-oriented design thinking for 
participatory democratic institutions.  However, deliberative systems theory has so far 
remained an analytical enterprise, less concerned with practical questions of democratic 
design. 
This paper engages directly with the question of what a systems orientation to democratic 
innovation looks like, asking whether it is able to address the frustrations with previous 
attempts to institutionalise deliberative ideals. We explore these questions through an 
investigation of a pioneering attempt at democratic innovation: NHS Citizen (NHSC).  Soon 
after NHS England was established in the 2012 Health and Social Care Act, its appointed 
board began to think about how it might deliver on its new statutory duty to engage with the 
public. Ideas about how this duty might be carried out rapidly expanded from traditional 
approaches to stakeholder consultation towards a much more open, multi-faceted and 
radical design. The aim of NHSC became to tap into, connect up and channel the wide 
range of different settings of discussion that already exist, sequentially linking wild talk in 
social media, into spaces of testimony sharing and evidence-giving, right through to the 
considered deliberations of the NHS England board. NHSC therefore bears remarkable 
affinities—both in the motivations underpinning its development and in its final model—with 
recent shifts in deliberative democratic thinking. It exemplifies a shift in focus away from 
consideration of a single forum which might embody deliberative democratic norms, instead 
emphasising a range of differentiated settings through which those norms are distributed. 
NHSC thus offers a fascinating case through which to explore contemporary efforts towards 
democratic reform that are in line with systemic ideals. Through detailed study of this case, 
we illuminate the ways a deliberative systems orientation to democratic innovation might 
enable some creative mitigations to the problems of institutionalisation that have troubled 
earlier participatory democratic institutions, such as the overweening power of the 
commissioning organisation and the disconnection from mass publics, as well as highlighting 
the new challenges it presents, such as the difficulties of incorporating alternative logics of 
participation and practically defining the relevant boundary of empowered space. 
2SYSTEMS THINKING: THE ANTIDOTE TO INSTITUTIONAL 
DESIGN?
Systems thinking has become the new orthodoxy in normative deliberative theory (e.g. 
Dryzek 2009, 2010; Mansbridge et al. 2012; Neblo 2015; Parkinson 2006). Justification of 
this systemic view explicitly turns upon critiques (both from within and outside of deliberative 
democracy) of the proliferation of discrete institutional innovations. John Dryzek, for 
example, contends that “a systemic turn is the antidote to the institutional turn” (Dryzek, 
2010, p.7). Similarly, Mansbridge et al. (2012, p.1-2) and Parkinson (2006, p.147) situate 
their deliberative systems accounts against the scale and legitimacy problems of individual 
deliberative forums. Criticisms of the previous orthodoxy of democratic innovations can be 
grouped into three broad institutionalisation problems: the power of the commissioner, 
disconnection from everyday politics and a lack of legitimation capacity. 
One long-running criticism of the institutionalisation of mini-publics and other deliberative 
initiatives is that, rather than offering an authentic tool for deeper democratisation, they are 
adopted predominantly as a legitimation tool by public authorities wanting to rationalise and 
control public debate (Papadopoulos & Warin, 2007; Parkinson, 2004). The focus on internal 
dynamics of deliberation within a forum “leaves intact the conventional institutional 
structures” (Pateman, 2012, p. 10). Within participatory processes commissioned by public 
authorities, citizens rarely have control over the conditions under which they participate: 
whether that be who has the right to participate, the design of the participatory institution, or 
the terms of the agenda on which their views are elicited (Chambers, 2009; Dean, 2017; 
Parkinson, 2006). The concern, then, is that deliberative forums give too much power to the 
commissioning organisation, providing a  façade  for perennial problems of elite and special 
interest domination (Johnson, 2015).
A second current of criticism is more pragmatic: concern with the realpolitik limitations that 
prevent democratic innovations from effectively linking either to civil society or empowered 
governing practices (see especially Papadopoulos 2012). The one-off nature of much 
democratic innovation precludes integration into the “regular political cycle in the life of the 
community” (Pateman, 2012, p. 10). Invented ‘forums’ can crowd out organic forms of civic 
life and citizen participation (as observed by: Boswell et al., 2015; Martin et al., 2018; 
Stewart, 2016). In addition, the disconnection from the everyday business of public 
authorities hampers the capacity of democratic innovations to deliver insights to 
policymakers that are responsive to their immensely complex agendas and an ever-shifting 
political context. The claim here is that while political elites may authentically desire public 
input, prevailing modes of democratic innovation fail to deliver it in a form that is sufficiently 
usable (see Hendriks & Lees-Marshment, 2018), thus they become side-lined in favour of 
other competing institutional imperatives (e.g. Martin, 2011; Newman et al., 2004; Syrett, 
2006).  
Third, the deliberative systems approach criticises the legitimation capacity of discrete 
democratic innovations. Given the small numbers of participants that take part, questions 
arise as to whether even ideally constituted processes can legitimate binding collective 
decisions in large polities. The systems turn suggests that we should instead expect 
deliberative and democratic functions to be distributed through a range of differentiated but 
interconnected settings (Mansbridge et al., 2012). The systems approach is thus a move 
away from understanding democratic legitimacy through a narrowly prescribed account of 
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institutional structures and wider democratic practices (Parkinson, 2006).
Despite this attention to problems of institutionalisation for discrete forums, the practical 
implications of systems thinking for the design of democratic innovations have been 
neglected. The deliberative systems approach is instead more commonly employed as a 
normative standard, used to theorise and/or empirically evaluate the democratic health of a 
polity (Burall, 2015). Where it has focused on democratic innovations, it has been concerned 
with interpreting their effects in systemic terms (see: Curato & Böker, 2016; Felicetti et al., 
2016; Goodin & Dryzek, 2006; MacKenzie & Warren, 2012; Niemeyer, 2014). What is 
entailed by a systems approach to designing democratic institutions, as opposed to a 
systems approach to evaluating democratic institutions, remains opaque.
Clarity on this question is important because systems theory can and, as our empirical 
example will demonstrate, is influencing the design of democratic innovations. The long-
standing connection between deliberative theory and democratic innovations means 
theoretical developments have profound impacts on the community of practice interested in 
pursuing democratic renewal and reform. Indeed, there is considerable interaction, 
knowledge exchange and movement of skills and insights across the academy-praxis divide 
in this field. The systemic turn in deliberative theory, in this sense, does not just matter 
because it changes the analytic construct that political scientists use to analyse and evaluate 
real-world practices; it also matters because it has potential to re-shape those practices. 
By reconstructing the immanent logic of the variety of specifications of the deliberative 
system, along with their critiques of democratic innovation, it is possible to identify two core 
propositions that can guide democratic innovation in a more systems-oriented direction. The 
first injunction for democratic designers is that ensuring transmission between different 
democratic spaces is just as important as the dynamics within a space (Dryzek, 2010). 
When a new institutional arena is created, it should be embedded within existing networks 
and remedy a functional deficit, rather than displacing organic functional activity. Second, a 
single intervention should not be expected to realise the full panoply of necessary 
democratic functions (Mansbridge et al., 2012; Parkinson, 2006). Designs will likely have to 
distribute functions across different arenas, paying careful attention to which functions are 
realised where, and that the system as a whole is comprehensive. The aim of our analysis is 
exploratory: to understand the effects of adopting these ideas as design practice. Our 
ambition is not to apply or develop a new evaluative framework for assessing systems-
inspired democratic innovation. Rather, drawing on a pioneering real-world example, we 
explore how deliberative systems-inspired designs may (or may not) in practice address the 
problems of institutionalisation that have bedevilled democratic innovations. At the same 
time we consider whether new challenges emerge from applying this systemic approach to 
democratic design.
THE CASE: NHS CITIZEN 
NHSC was a participatory initiative launched by the appointed Executive Board of NHS 
England. It was a response to NHS England’s statutory requirement to engage, and Board 
members’ concerns that their decisions lacked public accountability. It was born into a 
complex institutional context that was in some ways propitious and in some ways 
challenging. Internally NHSC had influential backers on the Board. NHS England’s Public 
Voice Team, charged with co-ordinating the process, were committed to embedding an 
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relationship with the consortium of four small organisations with expertise in democratic 
engagement and public sector innovation – Involve, DemSoc, Public-I and the Tavistock 
Institute – commissioned to design and deliver NHSC. Nevertheless, support amongst the 
Board members and other high-level managers was not unanimous. Moreover, the process 
quickly developed its own momentum that shifted away from the initial proposal.
Inspired by the success of the Joanna Lumley-fronted campaign for Ghurka rights, the initial 
proposal by the Director for Patient Information, Tim Kelsey, was to convene a national 
assembly high-profile figures that could hold the Board to account through publicity 
campaigns in the national media. Over the next few months, other key actors – including 
NHS England’s Head of Public Voice, Olivia Butterworth, and Victor Adebowale at board 
level – steered the discussion from a focus on celebrity representatives towards a more 
grass-roots conception of engagement involving service-users and citizens. Plans for a 
celebrity assembly thus morphed into plans for a national citizens’ assembly in which 
members of the Board would meet with citizens and service-users to discuss NHS England 
priorities. Once Involve, DemSoc, Public-I and the Tavistock Institute were commissioned, 
the plans for a citizens’ assembly then further developed into the more ambitious design that 
closely resonates with ideas that inform deliberative systems.
In addition to the internal dynamics, NHS England was only one of the multiple power 
centres whose support was necessary to make NHSC a success. NHS England was itself a 
newly created organisation, thus without a pre-existing public. NHSC was an attempt to 
create this public within what was already a crowded participatory terrain, with a range of 
existing civil society groups and patient and public involvement structures (see: Dean 2016, 
p186-197). This was precisely what enabled a systems-orientation with the aim to channel 
existing activity. However, it also meant there were a number of better established 
participatory bodies weary of endless institutional reinvention and wary of the possibility of 
being usurped by NHSC. This was not helped by a febrile political context: NHS England 
was created under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition’s 2012 Health and Social 
Care Act, a broad package of health reforms that sparked significant controversy and protest 
amongst key stakeholders. As is likely whenever circumstances are complex enough to 
require a systems-oriented intervention, the institutional dynamics within which NHSC was 
situated were ambiguous, providing grounds for optimism that it could overcome certain 
problems of institutionalisation, but also significant challenges.
NHS Citizen as a systems-inspired democratic innovation
NHSC is one of very few examples to take a systems-inspired approach to democratic 
innovation. Its design incorporated the core claim of deliberative systems theory that 
different democratic functions are distributed across different arenas. It consisted of several 
interacting parts categorised into three broad stages – called Discover, Gather and 
Assembly (see Figure 1 and Figure 2) – each of which had its own function. These functions 
had a clear resonance with John Dryzek’s definition of the component parts of a deliberative 
system (most recent specification: Stevenson & Dryzek, 2014). Accordingly, it is an ideal 
case for understanding how systems-oriented design plays out in practice.
Dryzek divides democracy into three parts: private space, where political conversations and 
interaction take place in everyday contexts; public space, contexts that have been created to 
discuss political concerns; and empowered space, where binding collective decisions are 
made. His approach is concerned with processes of transmission, whereby private and 
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space to public space. The three-part Discover-Gather-Assembly design of NHSC embodied 
these concerns. It was intended to be a mechanism for moving from conversations and 
discourses in everyday and public space to decision making in empowered space, as well as 
establishing an accountability relationship between them.
Figure 1: NHS Citizen design 
Figure 2: Key components of NHS Citizen 
Discover would identify and map conversations about the NHS occurring in existing online 
and offline networks that cut across everyday and more public spaces. Gather provided a 
more formal online public space in which participants in NHSC could actively raise and 
discuss issues. These issues could be those identified in Discover or brought forward by 
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longer-term ambition that the Gather space could itself become a site for the coproduction of 
solutions between citizens/service-users and NHS professionals and managers – an 
ambition that it would also have empowered characteristics. Any issues relevant to national-
level NHS England policy identified through these two stages then went through a 
prioritisation process – a Citizens’ Jury – with those deemed most important forming the 
agenda for the biannual Assembly attended by the NHS England Board. In addition, the 
system operated with a ‘no wrong door’ policy, so issues inappropriate for the national-level 
Assembly were directed to other relevant NHS organisation. The Assembly was additionally 
expected to function as the primary site in which the NHS England Board was rendered 
accountable to the public, explaining actions taken to address issues from previous 
assemblies. Although only 250 people could attend the Assembly, it was also live-streamed 
meaning that this process of public justification could have an unlimited audience. 
NHSC additionally incorporated another important component from Dryzek’s deliberative 
systems approach. There was extensive meta-deliberation concerning the shape of the 
system itself. The design phase was conducted in the open, with a number of workshops 
held around the country to solicit feedback on and test the process. This was accompanied 
by a culture change programme to prepare NHS organisations (empowered space) for a 
more participatory mode of decision-making. As such, there was a broad-based attempt to 
engage all relevant stakeholders in meta-deliberation about the shape NHSC should take.
Our interpretation of NHSC as an attempt to realise a systems innovation is also supported 
by the ways the designers articulated their practice. During our empirical research, one of 
the lead protagonists referred to NHSC as “a multi-stage, information-led, participatory-
deliberative system”. The design team always intended to develop a systems approach to 
engagement and became familiar with the language and concepts of deliberative systems as 
the process developed. For example, during the design and implementation of NHSC, the 
Director of Involve, Simon Burall, held a visiting fellowship at the Centre for the Study of 
Democracy at the University of Westminster, where he was working on and later published a 
report reflecting on the ways in which the debate on deliberative systems might affect the 
work of democratic practitioners (see Burall, 2015). While NHSC could not be described as a 
self-conscious application of these ideas – Burrall himself acknowledges that he and the 
other architects of NHSC did not start the process with such a sophisticated theoretical 
understanding – it is clear that the practical design was informed by and inflected with 
exactly the sorts of concerns which have underpinned the systemic turn in deliberative 
democratic theory (see also Bussu, 2019).
Data collection and analysis
Our analysis of NHSC is based on a rich qualitative dataset. We drew on archived material 
from the NHSC website, including video content, graphic records and text documents 
associated with both the meta-deliberation in design workshops and the substantive 
deliberation off- and online. We observed and participated in two design workshops in 2014 
and 2015. We conducted a two-hour focus group with the four key civil society designers of 
the process, following on from an earlier interaction at a reflective roundtable during the 
2014 PSA Conference in Brighton. The final phase of data collection entailed interviews. We 
identified participants both through these earlier phases and then subsequent ‘snowballing’ 
in interviews. To ensure a diversity of perspectives we selected participants with different 
roles in and relationships to NHSC. This resulted in seven additional key informants, 
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managers involved in the day-to-day running and delivering NHSC, one civil society activist 
who participated in the process and one academic critic of the process. Interviews lasted 
between two hours and 15 minutes, but in practice most were 45 minutes to an hour.  We 
determined we had reached ‘saturation’ point once we stopped hearing new interpretations 
in the interviews that participants were willing to grant us. It is important to reflect here that 
we were not able to access critics of the process from within NHS England, who were 
predictably less enthusiastic to talk about the initiative.
Our approach to the analysis of this data was interpretive in nature. Interpretive research 
aims to elicit participants’ own understandings of social and political phenomena, and to 
draw on the narratives they tell to make sense of their experience in order to explain 
outcomes. Interpretive research has been at the forefront of empirical research into 
deliberative systems because it is well-suited to unpacking the rich features of deliberative 
practices in context (see Ercan et al., 2017). As such, it is ideally suited to exploring and 
teasing out the dynamics of an open-ended, organic process like NHSC. In practice, then, 
we engaged in a form of abductive reasoning (see Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2011) in 
manually coding and presenting the data and analysis. Given our intention to use the case to 
interrogate propositions generated from theory – what Blatter and Blume (2008) call a 
‘congruence’ approach to case study research – we started with analytical categories drawn 
from the literature across deliberative systems and democratic innovation, refining them in 
light of our analysis in an iterative process. This approach enables us to use the story of 
NHSC, as it is interpreted by those who were involved, to explore the potential and 
challenges of systems-oriented democratic innovations, drawing out the broader lessons 
from this case for the theory and practice of deliberative systems and democratic innovation.
ANALYSIS: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF SYSTEMS-
ORIENTED DESIGN FOR DEMOCRATIC INNOVATIONS
A) Challenging the power of the commissioner
If traditional democratic innovations have often ceded too much power to the commissioning 
organisation, could a systems approach focussed on transmission from private and public to 
empowered space do a better job of bottom-up agenda-setting? Initially, it seemed as if 
NHSC was born into a benign context conducive to such an approach. The designers were 
excited by the opportunity that NHSC presented. One described it as “catnip to the 
democratic practitioner”: 
It was pretty irresistible wasn’t it, the idea of it being about being able to take 
democracy into the heart of a massive piece of bureaucracy which had just 
had its democratic accountability ripped away through an injudicious act of 
parliament. If you’re interested in democracy and you’re interested in public 
service reform, for me, it was irresistible. (Focus Group)
Key to this enthusiasm was the apparent attitude of NHS England. NHS England’s Public 
Voice team, which oversaw the process, was seen to be an ideal commissioner.
I think also one of the things that attracted me to it was the fact that the 
client… seemed to be so in the same place on the things that we wanted to 
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something different. (Focus Group)
Importantly, the initiative had key champions on the NHS England Board who not only 
supported the objectives of the participatory process, but also commissioned a ‘culture 
change’ programme at least in part to foster a more participatory organisation internally. One 
of the board-level champions of NHSC explained that “I learned this the hard way from 
previous attempts to engage people that you needed the leaders”. Sensing some anxiety 
about engaging directly with the public amongst other Board members and professionals 
within NHS England, the Tavistock Institute, an organisation with expertise in developing a 
participatory working culture in the public sector, was engaged to work specifically with 
senior professionals within NHS England and secure their buy-in to the new way of working 
that NHSC would require.
Despite the early promise, it soon became clear that NHSC, like most democratic 
innovations, was surrounded by complex organisational politics. One of the board-level 
champions reflects that his enthusiasm may not have been shared by colleagues, but they 
were initially unwilling or unable to articulate their concerns:
Everybody agreed with the principle of engaging the public. Because how 
could you not? It’s public service. But…  Have you come across the Abilene 
Paradox? Everybody agrees to do something, but when it’s done they all 
start complaining, asking why did they do it, and that’s because they weren’t 
honest about how uncomfortable they were about doing it in the first place. 
(Interview with a board-level champion)
In addition, NHSC was conceived by the Board at a very particular moment, when there was 
an absence of everyday business. 
It was February 2013 where they met for the first time. They had no 
responsibilities; they didn’t take power until April 2013 and they just lost that 
link to Parliament and they had a couple of thinkers in there and they were 
pushed to do it by a couple of board members and that moment will not 
happen again. (Focus group)
As NHS England’s workplan became more concretised, the tensions between its own 
agenda and an ambitious participation initiative became more apparent: 
Then they wrote the Five Year Forward View, and suddenly [the Board] had 
a business plan to deliver. So, what they didn’t want was, the reality is what 
was much more difficult in that space was to have an open call from Citizen 
saying this is what we want to talk about. (Focus group)
NHSC thus provides a useful case for examining the prospects of the systems approach to 
this perennial problem of the power of the commissioner. It was characterised by both the 
shift from an initially benign context to growing concern from the commissioner, as well as a 
culture change programme that anticipated and attempted to address this issue.
A quirk of the NHSC design process meant that for the first Citizens’ Assembly, Discover 
and Gather were not fully operational. Issues for the Assembly agenda were selected from 
Gather, but the agenda prioritisation was not in place, so they were selected top-down by the 
Public Voice Team. Conscious of proving the utility of the process to Board members, issues 
were selected that echoed their strategic priorities (interview with a process manager). This 
approach reflects the kind of ‘invited space’ that has been critiqued by some scholars for 
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power. From the Board’s perspective the Assembly was a success. A process manager in 
NHS England reported the collective reaction of the Board as “a very positive experience” 
(Interview with a process manager). It was followed by Board approval for NHSC to continue 
under the leadership of the original designers in collaboration with the Public Voice team. 
Once the full NHSC process began to take root, the Assembly agenda was set bottom-up 
through the Gather process, and as the implications of this began to emerge, the Board’s 
support waned. The next Assembly was not such a comfortable experience for some Board 
members:
This is the first full run through of the citizen process, so the issues are not 
ones that the board identified with.  But they were definitely issues that the 
people in the room identified with … [We] managed to get groups and 
organisations involved who wouldn’t normally be involved at that level, and 
we posed very difficult questions to the board. I think by that point they’d got 
to the stage where they thought, ‘we don’t know what to do with this, we’re 
potentially building up too much power, the expectation is we’re going to be 
able to do stuff with all this but we can’t because it’s not in our business plan 
or board priorities’. (Interview with a process manager)
A Board level champion suggests that as NHSC embedded, a split in the Board became 
obvious:
More than half the board got more relaxed with each meeting as they 
understood that the sky wasn’t going to fall in and they weren’t going to be 
ripped limb from limb by a baying mob and as they became more 
comfortable with understanding that the public’s concerns were also our 
concerns and the public’s concerns could shed a light on what we were 
doing which could be quite helpful. But I think there were other members of 
the board who just thought that this was a waste of time. ‘Why are we doing 
this? What’s it for?’ (Interview with a board-level champion)
The situation was exacerbated when the main executive champion of NHSC on the Board 
announced that he was leaving and it quickly became clear that, even with the culture 
change activity, many Board members were no longer supportive (assuming that they had 
been in the first place):
… we had been assuming, because [a senior executive] told us, that he was 
absolutely bringing on all of those colleagues from the Board and that 
everyone was comfortable with all of this, and as soon as he left, it became 
incredibly apparent that they weren’t very comfortable with it at all. What 
they wanted was something that was like what we delivered at the first AGM 
- something relatively comfortable that they could go and be seen to engage 
and connect and mix with people. (Interview with a process manager)
Central to this concern was the language of accountability. NHSC organizers had advocated 
that the Assembly’s key function was as a site in the NHSC system where the Board could 
be held to account. But in practice a number of Board members were very uncomfortable at 
the prospect of being held to account in an unpredictable setting where they may not have 
access to adequate information, or where subsequent circumstances may force them to 
change their view (see also Bussu, 2019).  A board-level advocate captured the mood 
colourfully: “[They were thinking] shut this fucker down. I’m not doing that again. I don’t want 
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to be exposed in public again, this is going to be shut down”. On this reading, it was the 
empowerment of participants through NHSC – their capacity to determine the agenda of 
what was discussed in the Assembly – that was the death knell for the process. 
The lessons for whether a systems-oriented design can rebalance the power between 
participants and commissioner are somewhat ambivalent. In one sense the story is positive: 
NHSC pioneered an approach for transmitting concerns from private and public space onto 
the agenda for discussion in empowered space. It even had some modest successes in 
attracting attention to issues outside the Board’s strategic focus – notably in relation to care 
for transgender patients and in mental health treatment. Nevertheless, the process proved 
so uncomfortable for some of the institutional actors that it triggered a power-play to 
terminate the entire process.  
The culture change programme proved ineffectual in addressing this issue. One of the Board 
champions reflected on the Tavistock Institute’s attempts to assuage concerns of other 
board members and secure their buy-in to the process,
Now, the first clue, was the difficulty that the Tavistock Institute were having 
in getting time in people’s diary. The more senior they are, the more freedom 
they have over their time. So, if they choose not to do this, then, you know… 
So that was really difficult and the Tavistock people, really smart people - 
these were highly qualified people - and they were asking “Are they really 
committed?” And I was “Yeah, yeah, of course they are.” But I was thinking 
“Oh shit, I’m not sure they are!”
Organisational culture change is difficult enough to achieve from the top when there is strong 
commitment, but this was an attempt at horizontal culture change. It was championed by 
Board members trying to change the attitudes and behaviours of their peers rather than their 
subordinates, thus it was extremely easy for the other board members to resist through non-
compliance. One of the designers commented on their resultant powerlessness, “we were 
like ants crawling up the elephant’s leg going, if we just get behind the ears then we can 
steer” (Focus group).
The experience of NHSC sheds light on the central notion of ‘transmission’ in deliberative 
systems and its implications for democratic design. The components of the initiative 
connected neatly in theory and on an artist’s sketchbook, but in practice empowered actors 
lost enthusiasm the more authentic the transmission from public space threatened to 
become. This suggests an especially crucial role for ‘transformation’ as ideas and claims 
move from public space and inevitably confront technical and administrative obstacles in 
empowered space (see Neblo, 2005). The mere presence of institutional links is insufficient 
to ensure authentic transmission, as empowered elites can mischaracterise ideas and claims 
emerging from public space, or dismiss them as unfeasible (see Boswell et al., 2016). A 
systems approach to design must be attuned to how and how closely the claims and actions 
of empowered elites map onto the public’s preferences. NHSC’s culture change programme 
represented a key nod in this direction. But this aspect of the design was under-resourced – 
reflective of a more general theme we turn our attention to next.
B) Sustainable funding 
While realising sustainable funding is a common problem for institutionalising democratic 
innovations, developing a systems-oriented design significantly complicates the issue. 
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Discrete democratic innovations have been criticised for a lack of adequate resourcing to 
support anything beyond a short-term, project orientation (see especially Lee, 2014). But 
commissioning a Citizens’ Assembly is much simpler than commissioning a systems 
intervention. The former is a well-established participatory ‘technology’ that can be easily 
costed, and it is clear to public organisations what they are buying. A systems intervention 
that attempts to take account of institutional context, harnessing existing activity and making 
connections between different organisations, is always likely to be a more bespoke affair. In 
addition, if the design is to incorporate genuine meta-deliberation regarding the shape it 
should take, then it is not possible to know ex-ante what is being commissioned. NHSC was 
exactly this type of process and it produced significant tensions with public service 
procurement practices. 
The only way to fund NHSC whilst respecting the NHS’ procurement rules was through a 
series of short-term grants. The designers of NHSC reflected on how it was impossible to 
design systemically – in particular Discover and Gather – without proper resources. 
I’ve wondered whether one of the hidden consequences of the bad 
procurement method was we never had visibility that something was going 
to carry on long enough to enable us to put the structures in place, to enable 
it to work right… We only knew we had this much till then, then this much till 
then, and it was always very ad hoc and never certain. (Focus group)
This funding arrangement also played into the outsized power of the commissioning 
organisation. While no explicit decision was made at Board level to “kill” NHSC, as powerful 
Board members increasingly felt uncomfortable with the initiative, funding to the designers 
began to dry up. What was relatively small money for NHS England was a significant 
proportion of income for these small organisations. Without guaranteed funding they 
increasingly spent time that could have been devoted to improving NHSC worrying about 
their financial sustainability. As resources stopped flowing, NHSC slowly wound down 
without any public justification of the decision having to be made. As one of the designers 
noted dryly: “It was like a Beckett play, some bizarre non-ending ending” (Focus group). 
While board level champions attempted to free up funds, they were faced with a resistant 
bureaucratic system:
What happened was it got harder and harder to fund the organisations…it 
became harder and harder to squeeze the money out of NHS England. NHS 
England has a byzantine process of agreeing spending. It is supposed to 
stop you from spending anything and the small organisations didn’t have 
any resources so they had to be paid on time and it was increasingly difficult 
to get the system to pay them. Decisions were just held and one by one, 
they [the designers] were saying ‘we can’t carry on like this, we can’t get 
anyone to pay us or agree that they will pay us or put us on the budget’. 
(Interview with a board-level champion)
NHS England enacted ‘death by procurement’ as it became uncomfortable with the direction 
of the process. The sustainability of financing for a systems approach is an important issue. 
It is questionable whether systems-oriented democratic innovation is practicable given 
current public procurement rules (in England). Designing a participatory-deliberative system 
that works as an ongoing process requires an approach to sustainably finance that system, 
one which does not give the commissioning organisation power to terminate the process as 
soon as it becomes challenging.
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C) The pragmatic limits to meta-deliberation 
NHSC took a radically transparent and self-reflexive approach to development, which the 
lead organisations termed ‘designing in the open’ – or ‘meta-deliberation’ in deliberative 
systems terms. Rather than inviting participants into a ready-made structure, NHSC invited 
participants to help shape the design of the democratic innovation. Open workshops were 
held around England to discuss the design, and at the end of these sessions participants 
were invited to redraft the system along with the four lead organisations. All key meetings 
were webcast and archived, with design documents freely available online1. NHSC also had 
a significant social media presence, promoting these materials and extending access to the 
design process, for instance, by enabling remote participation in the design meetings. This 
extensive meta-deliberation process was a very public performance of openness and 
adaptability, as opposed to a long tradition of carefully controlled and stage-managed 
consultation. 
Some participants welcomed this approach, seeing in it an authentic commitment to do 
participation differently:
I was impressed by the desire on the part of the folk from NHS to make this 
work and how passionate they were about patient participation... I suppose 
it was quite, it struck me, as refreshing, quite democratic, quite brave really, 
to open the floor to everybody. (Interview with a participant)
But other participants were sceptical about how much latitude they really had to influence the 
overall design: 
Despite the fact that it brought a number of people in who voiced some more 
views, it was predetermined. They knew what they wanted. They wanted a 
National Assembly and they weren’t listening to people even then. So, I 
attended three meetings and walked out on the third. (Interview with a 
participant)
The organisers themselves noted this challenge of co-designing NHSC, recognising they 
ought to have been clearer about what was open to change and what had been negotiated 
between themselves and NHS England.
I’m not sure we made the shift early enough in those workshops about how 
the decision was going to be made, who was taking it. I think we failed there 
to place our own decision making structure with clarity about who was going 
to be involved and how it was going to happen, and we weren’t able to be 
open about it. And so, for those people who took part, most deeply from the 
citizen side, those designs [based on decisions made by organisers and 
NHS England] suddenly seemed a bit opaque and odd. (Focus group)
The meta-deliberation process to design the participation system therefore faced similar 
charges to those often levelled at participatory initiatives: that the organisers have too much 
power relative to the participants, and that consultation was mis-sold as coproduction.
Tensions within the design process particularly became apparent when the designers’ 
proposed using random selection at two points. The first concerned how to transmit and 
prioritise issues from Gather for the Assembly agenda. The designers proposed inserting a 
citizens’ jury between Gather and Assembly. There needed to be a fair and legitimate 
1 Unfortunately these materials have since been taken offline, once NHSC was wound-down.
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method of deciding which of the many issues raised in Gather should be taken to the 
biannual Assemblies. Their solution – reasonable from a democratic innovations perspective 
– was that proponents of issues should be able to present them to a randomly selected 
group of citizens, who would then make impartial judgements about which issues would go 
forward. But this decision provoked a heated debate within Gather as active participants in 
NHSC saw their power being usurped by a randomly selected body. Similarly, when the 
designers suggested the Assembly should be randomly selected, there was resistance. One 
critic posted the following attack on the NHSC website:
A ballot was held to decide which items should be sent to a secret meeting, 
where a group of 15 anonymous people would vote on which items were to 
be sent to be chatted about by 250 people in London. 250 people who’d 
never contributed to Citizen before. (‘Cassandra’, online commenter)
It is ironic that the meta-deliberation, aimed at improving the legitimacy of participation, was 
charged with similar forms of illegitimacy often directed against more traditional participatory 
procedures. The critique draws attention to the importance of considering the corporeality of 
meta-deliberation when building it into democratic innovation. Meta-deliberation is itself a 
process that must be enacted, directed and managed. This process needs just as much 
attention as the process it is intended to produce. Moreover, it is likely to be contested. 
There thus remains a question-mark over whether meta-deliberation resolves problems of 
institutionalisation or just displaces them to a new arena.
D) The pragmatic limits of distributing democratic functions
An intervention in which different arenas perform different functions promises the possibility 
that the overall design can integrate a range of different participatory logics to generate a 
more comprehensive form of legitimacy (Dean, 2017). NHSC for example aimed to harness 
the connections and expertise of civil society groups to surface the most important health 
policy issues, but filter these through groups of randomly selected citizens in order to get a 
more inclusive picture of public values, that was not dominated by the most powerful health 
lobby. In reality this necessitated that participants would be willing to be included in some 
parts of the process and not others, and that the operational logics of different parts of the 
process could be firewalled from each other. Both proved difficult to realise in practice.
The designers’ perspective was that NHSC as a system should be open to everyone – from 
groups already actively working with NHS England, to marginalised groups that found it hard 
to have their voice heard, and citizens who may have had little direct experience of NHS 
services. Nevertheless, some parts of the system were not open: attendees for the citizens’ 
jury and Assembly were to be randomly selected. It became apparent that some of those 
who participated in one part of NHSC were not happy about being excluded from other parts 
– as per the above quote from Cassandra, and the aforementioned reaction from some 
participants against the move from self-selection to random selection. The meta-deliberation 
process and the resultant battle over who should attend the Assembly embodied a clash 
over who and what NHSC was for. 
As its name reinforces, NHS Citizen had a broader scope than patient involvement.
The NHS belongs to everybody, but while there are many opportunities to 
be involved as a patient, there are too few opportunities to be involved as a 
citizen and owner of the NHS – raising issues that the NHS needs to talk 
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about, and shaping its strategy and actions. (Tavistock Institute et al., 2014, 
p. 3)
A large number of the stakeholders who became involved in the self-selected, meta-
deliberation process were, however, from patient participation organisations, more familiar 
with a different logic of participation. For patient groups, their members – or more explicitly, 
their representatives – were the authentic participants because of their lived experience:
There were individuals who sat on senates or national user groups who were 
saying “You can’t ask the public. They don’t know anything. You need to 
have people who’ve been through cancer and represent other people 
because they really know how it works”, and they were fighting us all the 
way. (Focus group)
This generated a tension between the idea of citizen participation and group representation:
I think the people who were participating were often patient activists so they 
had an understanding of accountability that was very much based on 
representativeness, right? So, they wanted to have elected representatives 
at the Assembly, and we were doing something different. So a lot of the 
choices around the design of the Assembly and who to invite were also 
trying to be a compromise between what they asked, their concerns, and 
what we felt based on the literature and based on the initiatives that we 
thought would work best. (Interview with a process manager)
These were not simply abstract conceptual debates within the design process, but had real 
consequences for how NHSC was eventually realised. In the end, the designers adopted a 
compromise that integrated random selection of ordinary citizens with inclusion of patient 
representatives from relevant stakeholder groups. While experimenting with random 
selection and interest group representation has been tried in other settings such as G1000 
Netherlands (where organisers attempt to recreate ‘the system in one room’), it is a difficult 
combination of selection mechanisms to justify. Should we understand the Assembly as a 
space where service users can coproduce commissioning strategies with Board members or 
where citizens hold NHS England to account for pursuing broadly held public values about 
NHS services? 
This tension regarding what NHSC was for permeated the entire process. Designing a 
complex system means you can promise: to build an organic social movement, and to 
manage a carefully channelled form of public engagement; to enable mutual engagement 
between policy elites and participants in the process, and to hold the NHS England Board to 
account; to hear from participants as citizens and as patients. This is not to suggest these 
promises were disingenuous. All these claims were true of the process itself; they were true 
of what the architects behind NHSC hoped to achieve. Yet in practice it was difficult to corral 
these different ideas into different parts of the system, when that system is being designed 
as a process. Instead, their competing logics bled into one another, causing significant 
tensions that shifted the design in particular directions. As one lead designer reflected:
[If] you’re designing for something that is for a general audience, you need 
to have a broader set of users than the people who are most interested in 
spending a day in a workshop with you, talking about this … They weren’t 
the worst people. They were wonderful people! But at the same time they 
(we) designed something that was not useful for the normal human being, 
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without an amount of knowledge and time commitment that realistically 
people don’t have for the NHS. (Focus group)
By its end NHSC was unable to clearly delineate different arenas for different functions. All 
aspects incorporated, at least partly, a patient participation logic, and when the designers 
attempted to diverge from this they met resistance.
This has important implications for the core claim of the deliberative systems approach: that 
distributing functions across a system will result in greater legitimacy. The systems account 
may be a more realistic and nuanced vision of normative legitimacy in democratic 
governance, but it is complex and counterintuitive. One of NHS England’s process designers 
commented on how it is hard to communicate the complexity of a systems logic and design:
I think it became [the lead contractors’] vision and I think they were 
intellectually honest in that everything was open for comments and input 
from the public and they put a lot of effort in organised workshops where 
there was a real effort to incorporate the input we got from the patient 
activists and the staff and whoever decided to participate. But at the same 
time, I think the people participating even felt like they couldn’t catch up... I 
think sometimes they struggled to communicate their vision properly. 
(Interview with a process manager) 
For normative legitimacy to translate into perceived legitimacy it would be necessary for 
participants and observers to adopt a systems perspective. But does anyone apart from 
democratic theorists and institutional designers take a systems perspective? The evidence 
from NHSC is people took a citizens-eye view (Stewart, 2016) rather than a systems 
perspective. Participants struggled to understand even this relatively small system, how its 
components fit together, and why different components might operate on different logics. 
Instead they wanted a more uniform approach. Thus, distributing functions across a complex 
process actually created legitimacy problems.
E) The boundary problem
NHSC aimed to avoid the charge directed against so many democratic innovations that they 
are insulated from and displace more organic participatory activity. From the outset there 
was an awareness that it operated in an institutional space crowded with a variety of 
participation mechanisms. One of the NHSC design documents was careful to articulate how 
the process did not intend to displace existing activity, but support it: 
NHS Citizen will connect and support existing patient and public involvement 
work, it will not duplicate or further fragment it. (Tavistock Institute et al., 
2014, p. 3)
Rather than substituting for existing activity, in many ways the success of NHSC was 
predicated on other autonomous activity. For example, Discover, which intended to use web-
scraping tools to surface issues from ongoing online conversations about the NHS, mirroring 
Mansbridge’s (1999) concern with drawing everyday talk into the deliberative system, 
obviously depended upon the existence of such conversations. 
Our interviewees agreed unanimously that NHSC was impressive in its ability to connect 
with a diverse range of civil society groups. The process leveraged the existing connections 
of the Public Voice Team, but also went beyond them. This included well-established and 
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well-organised patient networks around cancer and mental health, as well as a range of 
groups that are often neglected in participatory governance initiatives, such as transgender 
people, gypsy and traveller groups and young offenders. One regular participant in NHSC 
commented, “I’d never been in a forum where we’d reached out that well” (interview with a 
participant).
This connective activity, however, generated questions concerning where the boundary of 
the system lay. Much of what citizens and civil society groups wanted to discuss and 
influence was outside the remit of NHS England. The designers wanted to avoid the problem 
of citizens engaging with NHSC then being discouraged and disillusioned when their issue 
was deemed outside the competence of NHS England and thus not relevant. Essentially, it 
was decided that NHS England’s remit was too narrow a boundary for the system. 
Gather was key to extending this boundary, since it potentially enabled the inclusion of 
issues beyond NHS England’s competencies. It was intended to provide an architecture for 
self-organisation around specific issues: a focal point for democratic engagement by 
citizens, service-users and NHS organisations, rather than a discrete engagement initiative. 
It was planned that many issues could be resolved within this space of engagement and co-
production. First, the team facilitating Gather could redirect issues to the appropriate 
institution at the end of the agenda-setting process. Second, NHS professionals could 
participate in the Gather space themselves to coproduce solutions with other participants.  
Both required a connection to a host of other NHS institutions. 
Forming these connections was a substantial challenge, compounded by Gather suffering 
sorely from the aforementioned resourcing problems. Unlike for the NHS England Board, 
whose needs and desires were paid significant attention in the design process, there was 
little strategy for ensuring other NHS institutions would use the process. Redirecting issues 
proved to be difficult: “of course one of the complexities was why would Public Health 
England [for example] necessarily be on board with that. How do we get their buy in to this 
process which wasn’t their process?” (Interview with a process manager). Whereas NHS 
England were to be cajoled into seeing the value of NHSC through a targeted programme of 
culture change, other NHS institutions were meant to simply see the value of joining these 
discussions for themselves. Although pseudonymous registration makes it impossible to 
verify, there is no suggestion that front-line NHS employees ever participated in Gather, 
vitally undermining its ambition to be a space for coproduction. In an overstretched health 
system, where most staff are already overburdened, this understandably did not occur. The 
design thus significantly extended the boundaries of empowered space until its scale 
became almost indefinable. As such, realising a systemic democratic innovation fully 
connected to empowered space became a Herculean task.
LESSONS FOR SYSTEMS INNOVATION
Did the systems-oriented approach provide an antidote to the problems of institutionalisation 
that have troubled discreet democratic innovations? The architects of NHSC were adamant 
that the model they developed was a success – that in a less hostile context it could have 
worked more effectively:
Would I use the model [again]? Would I use the multi-stage information-led, 
participatory system, deliberative system model? Yes. (Focus Group)
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This will no doubt be tested in further experimentation and innovation in different contexts 
and different scales in years to come. Still, for now, NHSC throws into sharp relief the 
dilemmas of designing a systems intervention that lives up to the normative standards of the 
deliberative systems literature.
The systems-oriented design was not able to resolve common problems of democratic 
innovation. NHSC developed some innovative approaches to addressing the critique that 
democratic innovations give too much power to the commissioner. It created a multi-stage 
process for bottom-up agenda-setting, along with pioneering meta-deliberation that enabled 
input into the design of the innovation. Whilst this prevented the commissioner controlling the 
agenda and conditions of participation, it had the effect of alienating the NHS England 
Board. The NHSC system essentially institutionalised the perennial tension between civil 
society action and demands and governmental administrative activity. Though it exceeded 
the capacity of traditional democratic innovations to connect to civil society, it still struggled 
to deliver usable policy insight. Then when the crunch point came, NHS England held the 
purse strings and could simply shut NHSC down. 
This calls into question whether the relationship between public and empowered space is 
best conceived in terms of transmission (Habermas, 1996; Stevenson & Dryzek, 2014). To 
think of it as a transmission problem suggests democratic designers only need open 
channels of communication that can transmit from the former to the latter. NHSC opened an 
effective channel of communication for taking the agenda of public space into empowered 
space, but this transmission was rejected, because it was not perceived as useful to the 
established priorities of NHS England. Systems interventions thus need to go beyond 
transmission, and take ‘transformation’ just as seriously. In other words, we need to pay 
much more attention to the ways in which ideas from public space are considered within 
empowered space. These different discursive settings will have different norms and rely on 
different forms of rationality. In our case, we observe a gap between the everyday 
experience of the service user and the administrative logic of the NHS England board. The 
risk is that ideas and claims emanating from public space become ‘lost in translation’, either 
because they make little sense to empowered actors, or because empowered actors distort 
or dull their meaning. As such, we need to consider means by which the claims of public 
space are taken seriously following transmission. This may be achieved by, for example, 
reducing empowered space’s power to reject outright, or creating the conditions under which 
actors from public and empowered space co-create mutually acceptable agendas.  
Systems-oriented democratic innovation also brings into focus a new range of conceptual 
and pragmatic issues. First, it raised the conceptual problem of how legitimacy is to be 
understood in a system. Where functions are distributed, different forms of legitimacy will be 
in play that will have an effect on the overall legitimacy of the system. Where systems 
theorists want us to pay particular attention to the deliberative legitimacy of the whole system 
(Mansbridge et al., 2012; Stevenson & Dryzek, 2014), those participating in the system are 
more likely to be interested in the workings of specific parts rather than the qualities of the 
whole. 
A second, equally complicated issue, is the boundary problem. This has been a negligible 
issue for traditional mini-publics, which have tended to be commissioned by a single 
empowered actor to deal with a defined issue, but it was an important consideration for 
NHSC.  There is an implicit assumption within deliberative systems theory that the 
boundaries of deliberative (or otherwise democratic) systems are both definable and 
scalable to multiple levels of government and across sectors (see especially Mansbridge et 
al., 2012). Yet for NHSC it proved difficult to define the boundary of the system. It would 
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have made little sense to design boundaries in advance, since the boundary was determined 
by the limits of the issues raised through the process.  Nevertheless, the attempt at ad hoc 
extension, by directing issues to other relevant authorities, drew such a broad boundary that 
it was impossible for the initiative to penetrate this vast space. Some other institutions were 
brought into the initiative, but these were just a handful among potentially thousands of 
relevant partners. There were only very weak incentives for other NHS professionals and 
organisations to engage in an initiative they had not commissioned. This poses an important 
question about the commissioning of systemic democratic innovations, since it is difficult to 
see how any process commissioned by a single organisation on this kind of scale would 
have been able to map, then reach out to, a sufficient proportion of the health and social 
care stakeholders operating in England. As the number of potentially relevant actors 
proliferates, systems-oriented democratic innovation bumps up against the messiness that 
prevails across real-world governing silos.
CONCLUSION
The designers of NHSC were inspired, at least in part, by a desire to create a ‘participatory-
deliberative system’. This opened the space for a critical examination of the prospects of a 
systems-orientation to democratic innovation. Our approach was not to apply a deliberative 
systems framework to evaluate NHSC but to explore the ways systems-oriented intervention 
might mitigate the common problems of institutionalisation experienced by previous rounds 
of democratic innovations. We found that NHSC still struggled with a number of these 
problems, especially the outsized power of the commissioner and the inability to deliver what 
is perceived to be usable policy input by actors in empowered space. It is, however, too early 
to conclude that systemic democratic innovations are irredeemable. There are in practice 
degrees of success and failure, defined by the parameters of the particular political and 
institutional context. As a first attempt, NHSC pioneered some cutting-edge innovations. It 
trialled novel ways of connecting civil society actors into the agenda-setting of a deliberative 
mini-public, embarking on a culture change programme within the commissioning body, and 
developing a participatory initiative through meta-deliberation about the design. It also 
achieved modest, but direct, policy impact in a couple of specific areas. These suggest 
promising signs that can be built upon for further practical experimentation.
Whether systems-oriented democratic innovation is viable remains a live question though. 
From our analysis, we believe the success of future attempts will turn on three questions. 
First, can a sustainable connection be established between actors in public and empowered 
space that does not necessitate the former to forego their own agenda or make the latter feel 
compelled to ‘shut the fucker down’ when inevitably challenged or discomforted? Second, is 
it actually possible to get participants to sign up to the complex idea of legitimacy entailed by 
distributing different functions between different arenas and operating different parts of the 
process on different logics? Third, how do we practically draw the boundary of the system 
and ensure all the relevant organisations within that boundary participate? The answers to 
these questions are unlikely to be simple. If they prove unanswerable, it would pose a further 
question for deliberative systems theorists: is systems theory limited to evaluating existing 
arrangements, or does it provide any guidance for how to intervene to improve democracy? 
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